

20 October 1976

ATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Deputy Inspector General
FROM : E. H. Knoche, DDCI
SUBJECT : Downing Committee

I have read your memorandum of 14 October to the Deputy Legislative Counsel. I agree with all the points you have made in it and would like to be advised if you or [REDACTED] encounter any problems in carrying out what you suggest.

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I am particularly impressed with the need to count on the full-time participation of members of your working group who are actively involved in file research. I am interested also in ensuring that appropriate registry operations are provided for.

Please keep me informed.

STATINTL

[REDACTED]
E. H. Knoche

ATINTL

cc: [REDACTED]

ED

76-3136

14 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Legislative Counsel

FROM [REDACTED]

STATINTL

Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Downing Committee

1. It was announced in the morning meeting that you will be dealing directly with the members and staff of the Committee chaired by Representative Downing. It was also stated that I will serve as something of an internal coordinator in preparing responses to the Committee's request for information. Problems experienced in the course of the investigations last year have been going through my mind and I am presuming to make some suggestions here on how we might organize.

2. I already am chairing an informal work group comprised of representatives from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security. Our task had been to address the questions raised in Senator Schweiker's report in Book V of the final report of the SSC. CI Staff and Security are in pretty good shape on this, but the LA Division files require extensive attention. The two researchers originally assigned to work on the LA files have been pre-empted on a recurring basis and now five additional ones have been assigned to conduct the general research of my study group as well as to reply to requests from the Downing Committee. As far as research is concerned I think we are in basically good condition although we may find that additional people will have to be assigned.

3. It is my assumption that we will be responding to requests for documents, all of which I hope are submitted in writing. It is also my assumption that at some point the Downing Committee investigators will be given the same direct access to our files that was extended to the SSC (including Schweiker) investigators, subject to agreed security procedures. We will continue to

protect sources and methods and sanitize or paraphrase documents and written material taken out of the building.

4. To maintain some control and order it will be necessary to have one control point, which I assume will be yours. I recommend that the Review Staff registry, which is still in existence, be placed under your direct control. The two registry men now assigned there -- [REDACTED] are experienced STATINTL in the files now there and in the work they would have to do. They should be retained and probably should have one additional clerical assistant. I note that these two men have been under detail over a year, possibly to the detriment to their careers. It may be that our new relations with the Congress warrant the establishment of a special registry for this purpose and it may be desirable to formalize this registry with a permanent T/O with appropriate grades. At present the old Review Staff registry is subordinate to Executive Registry, and my suggestion is that it now be subordinated to you as a separate registry.

5. Procedures that should be followed in the registry, and the use to which it should be put, include the following:

- a. Copies of all incoming congressional requests.
- b. Copies of the focal point's dissemination of the request to the various action units within the Agency.
- c. Copies of all responses received from the action units.
- d. Copies of the final response to the congressional committee.
- e. Records pertaining to any interviews of current Agency employees by a congressional committee member or staff of that committee.
- f. Records pertaining to any material reviewed at the Agency by the staff or members of a congressional committee.

g. Maintain an adequate index to the above materials, which would preferably allow for retrieval on the basis of date, subject matter, and/or requesting committee.

6. As I have thought about the problems of dealing with a new set of investigators an attempt was made to recall and put down some of the main principles that we tried to observe in the previous investigations. They are attached hereto for such value as they may have.

7. I have talked with [REDACTED] about the relations that we can have with him in dealing with the DDO. While he feels that he should be kept posted he is prepared at present to leave the details of the operations to us. I propose calling a meeting of my study group this next week, with [REDACTED] in attendance. I think that you, or your office, should probably also become a member of that group when it is functioning as a coordinator for responses to the investigators.

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8. I hope you will excuse my presumption in sending this memorandum, but still smarting from the earlier problems we had with the investigations last year, and keenly aware of some of the lessons of that experience, it seemed to me important that we commence now to posture ourselves with the period ahead and to begin to arrange how we will work with one another.

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Attachment: A/s



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cc:



5 October 1976


SUBJECT: Procedures for Dealing with Congressional Investigators

1. It appears that the SSCI will continue to conduct some types of investigations in addition to normal oversight activities. The new Downing committee in the House will certainly be conducting investigations, some part of which will involve CIA; it now appears that it will be operating under a short deadline and its requirements may prove very pressing.
2. It may well be that there will be recurring investigatory situations for some period to come. It certainly is true of the present, and some of the difficulties experienced recently as a result of investigative initiatives from the SSCI suggest the need for formalizing procedures for handling this kind of activity. There should be a central spot to serve as a channel into the Agency and as a control point for coordinating Agency responses. Rather than having a variety of independent Congressional investigators, giving conflicting signals and moving at all levels within the Agency, this one focal point should serve to maintain some order in Agency responses.
3. Requests by investigators should be transmitted in writing. This would force some organization in the preparation of questions and would provide a basis for refining those questions where warranted. It would stand as the formal requirement of the investigative body, and would serve as a guide for the component responsible for preparing the response.
4. Security ground rules should be established consciously, and it is appropriate for the Agency to interest itself in the procedures being observed by the investigative body. These procedures should involve physical and document security, as well as personnel security, including formal standards to be accepted by all persons having access to classified material.

5. Agency standards for controlling certain types of information should be spelled out and agreed, as well as the sanitizing procedures required for documents to be transferred out of the Agency to the investigative body. While the investigators might be granted access to Agency documents on a case-by-case basis, the rule should be that operational materials involving sources and methods are not usually available. When access is granted to the raw documents, it should be understood that special controls and review of notes must exist.

6. The following categories of information to be protected should be agreed:

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The general problem of "sources and methods" and classified material must be kept in mind when information is passed to Congressional committees. Special arrangements can be negotiated in special situations, but the basic material to be reported remains the same, whatever the access to it that may be agreed.

7. It should be understood that CIA has the responsibility to review reports planned for publication by the investigative body; a condition for access to classified information will be the security review by the Agency of reports proposed for publication in an unclassified form. Consideration should be given an appeal formula where there is disagreement on publication, similar to that reached with the Pike Committee.

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Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP79M00467A000300070029-1

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

E.R 76-10249

DATE

14 October 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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20 Oct

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RTH
 I need to
 take some
 actions with
 respect to this.
 Pls see me.

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FORM 3-62

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED